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SYMPOSIUM 
Justice Blackmun and Judicial 
Biography: A Conversation with Linda 
Greenhouse 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE 
“WORLD OUT THERE”: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
SYMPOSIUM*
Heidi Kitrosser†
This issue and the symposium on which it is based were 
inspired by Linda Greenhouse’s wonderful and much-praised 
book,1 Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry Blackmun’s 
Supreme Court Journey.2  Greenhouse, the New York Times’ 
Pulitzer Prize-winning Supreme Court reporter,3 was one of 
two journalists4 granted early access to a treasure trove of 
personal and official papers left to the Library of Congress by 
the late Justice Harry Blackmun.5  Her book is based on 
Blackmun’s papers.6
 * This title is based on the title of Harold Hongju Koh’s 1994 tribute to 
Justice Blackmun: Justice Blackmun and the “World Out There,” which itself borrowed 
a phrase from a dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun.  For full citation information 
see infra note 9. 
 † Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. 
 1 For reviews of the book, see, for example, David J. Garrow, The Accidental 
Jurist, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 27, 2005, at 36; Laura Kalman, “Becoming Justice 
Blackmun”: Deconstructing Harry, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, § 7, at 9; Bob 
Minzesheimer, “Becoming Justice Blackmun” Follows an Ideological Journey, USA 
TODAY, May 9, 2005, at 4D; Jeffrey Rosen, A Pivotal Justice Less Than Supremely 
Confident, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2005, at E43. 
 2 LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S 
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005). 
 3 See Kalman, supra note 1. 
 4 The other journalist was Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio.  See 
Garrow, supra note 1, at 37. 
 5 Id.; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Unveiling Justice Blackmun, 72 BROOK. L. 
REV. 9, 11-16 (2006). 
 6 Garrow, supra note 1, at 37. 
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Justice Blackmun was both widely revered and widely 
criticized for emphasizing the real world ramifications of Court 
decisions and for acknowledging his own struggles in resolving 
some cases.7  It is fitting that a Justice so known for tying 
constitutional decision-making to its human geneses and 
consequences would leave to the public so extensive a record of 
the Justices’ decision-making processes and of his own 
experiences during his years on the Court.8
Becoming Justice Blackmun—the literary fruit of Linda 
Greenhouse’s access to this archive—very much reflects the 
connection that Justice Blackmun perceived between 
constitutional decision-making and the “world out there.”9  
Greenhouse elegantly weaves biographic stories with details of 
the Justices’ deliberations on cases and with doctrinal 
background on the areas of case law cited.  For example, in 
discussing Roe v. Wade10—the case for which Justice 
Blackmun, its author, is most famous—Greenhouse explains 
the doctrinal line of which Roe became a part and subsequent 
developments in the case law,11 the significance of Justice 
Blackmun’s past role as a lawyer for the medical profession,12 
and the personal and jurisprudential impact of public reactions 
to Roe on Justice Blackmun.13
Becoming Justice Blackmun, the Blackmun papers, and 
Justice Blackmun’s life itself raise three important lines of 
inquiry.  First, they raise descriptive questions about the 
relationship between jurisprudence and judicial biography.  
That is, how do judges’ experiences impact their jurisprudence?  
Second, they raise normative questions as to how much the 
public should know about the human story behind judicial 
decision-making.  As historian Laura Kalman notes, “Some 
justices destroy their papers. They believe the less the public 
knows about the Supreme Court, the more easily the illusion is 
  
 7 See, e.g., GREENHOUSE, supra note 2, at 114, 207-11, 222-24, 231-32; 
Garrow, supra note 1, at 41; Kalman, supra note 1; Rosen, supra note 1. 
 8 For discussion of the unprecedented breadth and depth of the Blackmun 
papers, see, for example, Kalman, supra note 1; Koh, supra note 5, at 11-16. 
 9 See Harold Hongju Koh, Justice Blackmun and the “World Out There,” 104 
YALE L.J. 23, 25 (1994) (“Blackmun came to see ‘another world “out there,”’ that the 
Court ‘either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize.’” (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 
438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))). 
 10 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 11 GREENHOUSE, supra note 2, at 73-80, 86-88, 98-101, 110-12, 133-34, 138-
45, 149-52, 182-206. 
 12 Id. at 74, 82-83, 90-92, 99. 
 13 Id. at 134-39, 206. 
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preserved that our system is based on rule of law, rather than 
men and women.”14   
Third, they raise normative questions about the impact 
that judges’ understandings of the “world out there”15 should 
have on jurisprudence, particularly on constitutional 
jurisprudence.  Some argue that social and cultural change 
should have no bearing on constitutional interpretation.16  
Justice Scalia, for example, famously argues that judges should 
adhere to the “original meaning” of the Constitution’s text, by 
which he means each provision’s original expected 
application.17  For instance, in discussing the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, Justice Scalia argues that the death penalty 
cannot legitimately be deemed “cruel and unusual,” regardless 
of that term’s evolving social meaning or of changing 
knowledge about the penalty’s application.  This is because the 
Constitution explicitly assumes the existence of the death 
penalty in provisions such as the protection against deprivation 
of life without due process of law.18  Others counter, however, 
that the content of the Constitution’s sweeping clauses are 
designed to evolve with social and cultural change.19  For 
example, Ronald Dworkin argues:  
[K]ey constitutional provisions, as a matter of their original 
meaning, set out abstract principles rather than concrete or dated 
rules . . . .  [T]he application of these abstract principles to particular 
cases . . . [thus] must be continually reviewed, not in an attempt to 
find substitutes for what the Constitution says, but out of respect for 
what it says.20
With respect to the death penalty and the Eighth Amendment, 
Dworkin argues:  
The framers of the Eighth Amendment laid down a principle 
forbidding whatever punishments are cruel and unusual. They did 
  
 14 Kalman, supra note 1. 
 15 See supra note 9. 
 16 See Jill Hasday, Conscription, Combat, and Constitutional Change Outside 
the Courts (draft article, on file with author) (citing prevalence of this view). 
 17 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 37-41, 45-46 (1997); see also Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in id. at 115, 119 
(referring to “‘expectation’ originalism, which holds that these clauses should be 
understood to have the consequences that those who made them expected them to 
have”). 
 18 SCALIA, supra note 17, at 46. 
 19 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 17, at 119-27. 
 20 Id. at 122. 
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not themselves expect or intend that [the] principle would abolish 
the death penalty, so they provided that death could be inflicted only 
after due process.  But it does not follow that the abstract principle 
they stated does not, contrary to their own expectation, forbid capital 
punishment.21
Each article in this issue tackles one or more of these 
important questions.  That is, each paper grapples with one or 
more of the following: the descriptive relationship between 
jurisprudence and judicial biography, the extent to which the 
public should be privy to this relationship, and the relationship 
between constitutional decision-making and the “world out 
there.”22
Dean Harold Koh’s article straddles all three questions.  
Dean Koh considers how to strike “the right balance between 
disclosure and nondisclosure” of Supreme Court deliberations,23 
and situates the history of the Blackmun papers and their 
release within this analysis.24  Drawing upon the papers and 
upon Linda Greenhouse’s book, he goes on to discuss aspects of 
Justice Blackmun’s life history, including Justice Blackmun’s 
evolving view of the relationship between government and 
individuals and parallel changes in his constitutional 
jurisprudence.25
Professors Earl Maltz, Nan Hunter and Dena Davis 
each focus on the descriptive relationship between 
jurisprudence and judicial biography.  Professor Maltz explains 
that “[e]ach [Justice’s interpretive] position reflects a unique 
set of influences and experiences.  Judicial biographies provide 
detailed accounts of these influences and experiences, thereby 
deepening our knowledge of the forces that ultimately shape 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.”26  Professor Maltz discusses the 
interplay of biography and jurisprudence through the example 
of Justice Peter V. Daniel.27
Professor Hunter reminds us of the importance of both 
recognizing the personal histories that color Justices’ 
jurisprudence, and not overstating the influence of particular 
biographical factors.  Professor Hunter focuses on Justice 
  
 21 Id. at 120-21. 
 22 See supra note 9. 
 23 Koh, supra note 5, at 10. 
 24 Id. at 10-12, 19-23. 
 25 Id. at 24-34. 
 26 Earl M. Maltz, Biography is Destiny: The Case of Justice Peter V. Daniel, 
72 BROOK. L. REV. 199, 199 (2006). 
 27 Id. at 200-09. 
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Blackmun’s background as a lawyer for the Mayo Clinic and as 
an admirer of the medical profession.28  She argues:   
[T]he longstanding “Mayo made him do it” explanation of Roe is 
wrong and should be jettisoned. . . .  Blackmun’s experiences as 
counsel for Mayo left him more pragmatic than starry-eyed about 
medical authority . . . .  His papers indicate that he was concerned 
about what he feared might be careless treatment of physicians’ 
interests, but he was not blind to medical parochialism nor engaged 
in a mission to expand the authority of doctors.29
Professor Hunter elaborates on the respects in which Justice 
Blackmun’s background did and did not impact his views in 
Roe v. Wade and other abortion cases.30
Professor Davis discusses Justice Blackmun’s 
involvement with his church and its relationship to his 
jurisprudence.31  Focusing on two sermons that Justice 
Blackmun delivered to his church, Professor Davis identifies 
multiple themes of compassion.32  Similarly, says Professor 
Davis, much of Justice Blackmun’s constitutional 
jurisprudence was grounded in compassion as a guiding 
principle.33  Professor Davis cites Justice Blackmun’s 
acknowledgment of the uncertainty of much constitutional 
interpretation, coupled with his observation that “‘we will 
grope, we will struggle, and our compassion may be our only 
guide and comfort.’”34   
The articles by Professors Jason Mazzone, Chai 
Feldblum and Andrew Koppelman move the discussion from 
the interaction between judicial biography and jurisprudence to 
the interpretation of particular constitutional provisions.  This 
raises the “relationship between constitutional decision-making 
and the ‘world out there.’”35   
Professor Mazzone considers Justice Blackmun’s view of 
juries.36  Professor Mazzone concludes that Justice Blackmun 
  
 28 Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of Medical 
Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147 (2006). 
 29 Id. at 149-50. 
 30 Id. at 162-66, 170-78, 192-93. 
 31 Dena S. Davis, Moral Ambition: The Sermons of Harry A. Blackmun, 72 
BROOK. L. REV. 211 (2006). 
 32 Id. at 216-30. 
 33 Id. at 229-34. 
 34 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting ALAN STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND 
MORALITY 262 (1984)), quoted in Davis, supra note 31, at 234. 
 35 See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 36 Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 35 (2006). 
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largely rejected conventional views of juries as “accurate fact 
finders, guardians of liberty, and a source of legitimacy.”37  
Instead, Justice Blackmun valued juries as democratic bodies 
in which citizens have the “opportunity . . . to participate in the 
workings of government.”38  This view manifests itself in 
Justice Blackmun’s opinions upholding—and dissenting from 
refusals to uphold—challenges to juror exclusions based on 
race and gender.39  From Justice Blackmun’s democracy-based 
perspective, it was crucial “to ensure at least that juries were 
open to all citizens.”40  Justice Blackmun’s approach to juries 
reflects his view of constitutional interpretation as an effort to 
inform constitutional principles with insights from the real 
world, including evolving social and cultural norms.  In this 
sense, Justice Blackmun’s approach to juries, as interpreted by 
Professor Mazzone, parallels Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of 
the Eighth Amendment.  As with the Eighth Amendment and 
capital punishment, the framers of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments surely did not expect the right to a jury trial or 
the concept of equal protection to encompass the right of 
women to sit on juries.  “But it does not follow that the abstract 
principle[s] they stated do[] not, contrary to their own 
expectation, forbid” gender-based exclusions.41
Professor Feldblum addresses the tension between the 
right to act in accordance with one’s core belief system, a 
concept that Professor Feldblum calls “belief liberty,”42 and the 
statutory equality rights of gays and lesbians.  She considers 
how judges should handle belief liberty claims brought by those 
who wish not to comply with equal rights laws.43  Professor 
Feldblum would balance the interests at stake on a case-by-
case basis.44  The bulk of her article explains the grounding of 
her balancing test, and the importance of grounding any case-
by-case balancing, in a real world understanding of the 
magnitude of interests on both sides of the scale.  With respect 
  
 37 Id. at 47. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 48-55. 
 40 Id. at 38. 
 41 See Dworkin, supra note 17, at 121. 
 42 Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 
BROOK. L. REV. 61 (2006).  Feldblum would protect belief liberty under the due process 
clauses.  See id. at 63.  She would include within the scope of protection those beliefs 
that “form a core aspect of the individual.”  Id. at 83. 
 43 Id. at 115-22. 
 44 Id. 
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to belief liberty, for example, she argues that judges often 
“downplay the burden on religious people” forced to 
accommodate gays and lesbians.45  Professor Feldblum, a 
former law clerk to Justice Blackmun who came out to him as a 
lesbian, also ties her analysis to her understanding of Justice 
Blackmun’s evolving views on gays and lesbians.46  
In response, Professor Koppelman’s article47 critiques 
Professor Feldblum’s article on two main grounds.  First, he 
would limit the constitutional protection of belief liberty to the 
First Amendment’s protection of religious free exercise.  
Professor Feldblum’s concept of belief liberty, he says, would 
“create a presumptive right to disobey any law you dislike 
intensely.”48  Second, he argues that Professor Feldblum 
underestimates the burden on conservative Christians who 
wish to avoid equal protection laws when she conducts case-by-
case balancing toward the end of her article.49  He concludes 
that courts typically should allow religious exemptions from 
antidiscrimination statutes to stand (or should impose such 
exemptions themselves under the First Amendment),50 while 
barring on equal protection grounds only those laws that 
“reflect[] a bare desire to harm an unpopular group.”51 
Professor Koppelman’s approach takes evolving public 
standards into account in a very direct way.  His approach 
would leave breathing room for community standards to evolve 
at their own pace, while maintaining some minimum equality-
based protection for gays and lesbians.  Koppelman concludes, 
in short, that courts “can’t hurry love”—or tolerance—through 
constitutional interpretation.52
In Becoming Justice Blackmun, Linda Greenhouse 
writes that the waters of Justice Blackmun’s life “carried him 
to places he had never expected to go.  And once having arrived 
at the destination, he stepped onto dry land and performed in 
ways that neither he nor others would have predicted.”53  This 
  
 45 Id. at 110. 
 46 See id. at 65-69. 
 47 Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination 
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125 
(2006). 
 48 Id. at 126. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 131-37. 
 51 Id. at 141. 
 52 See id. at 142. 
 53 GREENHOUSE, supra note 2, at 250. 
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is a fitting metaphor not only for Justice Blackmun’s life, but 
for the view of the Constitution arguably implicit in his 
jurisprudence and championed by Ronald Dworkin among 
others.  Under this view, the Constitution outlines broad 
principles and aspirations that gain content through the 
lessons and developments of time.54  The “world out there” does 
not write the Constitution, but it informs it deeply.  In 
analyzing constitutional doctrine, the articles in this 
symposium issue shed light on the application and desirability 
of this interpretive approach.  In analyzing the connection 
between jurisprudence and judicial biography, the articles 
connect doctrine to experience at a personal level.  Such 
emphasis on the relationship between the Constitution and 
lived experience befits Justice Blackmun, a man who, according 
to his successor Justice Stephen Breyer, managed to find in his 
“cloistered [Supreme Court] office . . . not a narrowing, but a 
broadening of mind, of outlook, and of spirit.”55
  
 54 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. 
 55 GREENHOUSE, supra note 2, at 249-50. 
